Design webhook delivery: a retry schedule with jitter, signature verification steps for four schemes, and what to key on so duplicates are harmless.
8 attempts over 10m 38s
After the last one the delivery is dead — your receiver never sees it.
Without jitter, every delivery that failed during an outage retries at the same moment. The retry storm is often what keeps the receiver down.
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Retries, signatures and idempotency look like three topics and are one decision. A receiver that verifies signatures but is not idempotent breaks on the first retry; a sender that retries without jitter turns one failure into an outage.
Jitter is not a refinement. Without it, every delivery that failed during an outage retries at the same instant, and that retry storm is often what keeps the receiver down. Spreading each wait across a range is what lets a recovering service actually recover, which is why jittered exponential backoff is the default here.
Signatures cover raw bytes, and the verification steps for every scheme start by reading the raw body before any parsing. Parsing JSON and re-serialising it changes key order and whitespace, so a receiver that verifies after parsing fails against a correct signature — a bug that looks like a broken sender and is not.
A timestamp in the signed payload is what stops replay. Without it, anyone who captures one valid delivery can send it again for ever. With it, your receiver rejects anything outside a tolerance window, five minutes being typical.
Comparison must be constant-time. A `===` on a signature leaks timing information that can be used to forge one byte at a time, which is why every language here uses its own timing-safe comparison.
Because without it every failed delivery retries at the same moment. A provider recovering from an outage gets the entire backlog at once, which knocks it down again. Jitter spreads the load across the window.
The signature covers the exact bytes sent. Parsing JSON and re-serialising changes key order and whitespace, so the recomputed signature will not match. Read the raw body, verify, then parse.
A normal comparison returns as soon as it finds a mismatched byte, and the timing difference can be measured. That lets an attacker discover a valid signature one byte at a time. Every language has a timing-safe comparison for this.
The provider's delivery or event id, when there is one — it is stable across retries of the same delivery. Hashing the payload works when there is not, but two genuinely identical events then collide.
No. The code is a template for your own secret, which never goes in this page, and no request is made.