Inspect an AWS IAM policy for administrator access by any route, NotAction with Allow, iam:PassRole without a resource, and a wide-open resource policy.
Waiting for a policy
Nothing is evaluated — no account, no simulator, no credentials.
The findings appear here
Administrator access by any route, NotAction with Allow, iam:PassRole without a resource constraint, and a resource policy open to every AWS account.
This reads one policy document. It is not a security review: what a principal can actually do depends on every other policy attached to it, on service control policies, permission boundaries and resource policies, none of which are visible here. A policy with no findings is not thereby safe.
IAM Policy Inspector runs entirely on your device — condition values are never echoed into a finding, and no AWS account or policy simulator is contacted.
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This is not a security audit and says so on every result. A policy's real effect depends on every other policy attached to the principal, on service control policies above it, on permission boundaries, on resource policies at the other end, and on session tags — none of which are in the document being read. A policy with no findings here is not thereby safe.
What it does is read one document and name the shapes that are almost always wider than intended. `"Action": "*"` with `"Resource": "*"` is administrator access however it was arrived at, and it is worth saying plainly rather than noting mildly.
`NotAction` with `Allow` grants everything except what is listed, which inverts the usual reading and is why it so often grants more than anyone meant — including every action AWS adds in future. It belongs with `Deny`, where the inversion works in your favour.
`iam:PassRole` without a resource constraint is the finding most worth having. It lets a principal hand any role to a service and inherit that role's permissions, which is the most common privilege-escalation path in AWS and looks completely innocuous in a code review. The check is identity-policy-only on purpose: in a role trust policy the resource is the role the policy hangs on, so `sts:AssumeRole` with no Resource is correct there.
Nothing is evaluated. No AWS account, no policy simulator, no credentials — and a condition's value is never copied into a finding, only its key.
Because it lets a principal hand a role to a service it can start, and the service then runs with that role's permissions. A policy that grants PassRole on `*` therefore grants, indirectly, whatever the most powerful role in the account grants. Constraining it to specific roles and adding an `iam:PassedToService` condition is the fix.
With `Allow`, it grants every action except the ones listed — including every action AWS releases in future, which no one reviewed. The inverted reading is easy to misjudge, and the blast radius grows on its own. `NotAction` with `Deny` is the safe direction.
No, and the tool refuses to imply that. It reads one document; the effective permissions depend on everything else attached to the principal, on SCPs, on permission boundaries and on resource policies. This finds common over-grants, not the absence of risk.
No. Condition keys are reported because they are what you need to see; the values are never read or echoed into a finding. Nothing leaves your browser either way.