Paste a header block and get it parsed, explained and checked for ambiguity — repeated singletons, folded lines and the Set-Cookie exception.
Waiting for headers
One per line, as `Name: value`. A request or status line first is fine.
Waiting for headers
Paste a header block to see it taken apart.
HTTP Header Inspector runs entirely on your device — nothing is uploaded, logged or stored.
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Header names are case-insensitive and header values are not. People half-know this, write `content-type` in one place and `Content-Type` in another, and are then surprised when a string comparison somewhere fails. Everything here folds names for matching and leaves values exactly as written.
The checks are about ambiguity rather than style. A repeated Content-Length is the classic request-smuggling setup, because a proxy and an origin can disagree about which to believe. Whitespace before the colon is the same class of problem: some servers accept it and some do not, so the two read the message differently. Obsolete line folding is deprecated and cannot be represented in HTTP/2 at all.
Set-Cookie is the documented exception to the repeated-header rule. Several are correct, and they must never be joined with commas — a cookie's expiry date contains a comma of its own, so a parser that concatenates them produces nonsense. Nearly every HTTP library carries a special case for this.
Values that look like credentials are masked by default. A header block is exactly the thing people paste into a shared ticket, and Authorization and Cookie both carry credentials. Revealing one is a deliberate click, and masking is a defence against someone reading your screen rather than encryption.
Nothing is uploaded, logged or written to browser storage.
Because a cookie's Expires attribute contains a comma — `Expires=Wed, 09 Jun 2027` — so joining two Set-Cookie headers with a comma produces something no parser can split back. Every other repeatable header may be joined; this one may not.
Yes, and not for tidiness. RFC 9110 forbids it, servers disagree about whether to accept it, and that disagreement between a front end and a back end is one of the ways a request gets interpreted two different ways — which is what request smuggling exploits.
It tells caches which request headers the response depends on, so they key on those too. Serve different content by Accept-Encoding or Origin without listing it in Vary and a shared cache will hand one visitor's response to another.
No. They are parsed in your browser, never logged, and never written to browser storage — which matters because a pasted header block often contains a live session cookie.
No. A masked value still shows its length and first characters, which is often enough to recognise a credential somebody already has. It is a shoulder-surfing defence.