Inspect a workflow for script injection through event context, pull_request_target secret exposure, unpinned actions and over-broad job permissions.
Waiting for a workflow
No GitHub API and no token — the YAML is read as text.
The findings appear here
Script injection, unpinned actions, over-broad permissions, broken job dependencies and runner cost.
This reads structure. It cannot tell you whether an action is trustworthy, whether a secret exists in your repository, or whether the workflow passes — all of which need the repository and a run. What it can see is the shape: which triggers fire with which permissions, where untrusted input reaches a shell, and which actions could change under you.
GitHub Actions Workflow Inspector runs entirely on your device — nothing is uploaded.
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Two findings here are genuine vulnerabilities rather than style notes, and both are easy to write by accident.
The first is script injection. `${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}` inside a `run:` block is substituted into the shell before the shell runs, so a pull request titled with a shell metacharacter and a command executes that command in your runner, with whatever the job's token can do. The fix is to pass it through `env:` and reference the environment variable, so the shell sees data rather than source. The inspector lists every untrusted context it found in a `run:` block.
The second is `pull_request_target` combined with a checkout of the pull request's head. That trigger runs with the base repository's secrets, and checking out the fork's code then running it hands those secrets to anyone who can open a pull request. This is reported as critical because it is one, and because the two halves are usually added weeks apart by different people.
Beyond those: actions pinned to a mutable tag, jobs with broader permissions than their steps use, missing concurrency control, and `continue-on-error` on a step that is meant to be a gate. Each says what the consequence is.
Nothing is executed, no GitHub API is called and no token is needed. The workflow is parsed as YAML in your browser.
`${{ }}` expressions are substituted into the script text before the shell parses it. A title containing a quote and a semicolon ends the intended command and starts another, which then runs with the job's token. Passing the value through `env:` and using the variable means the shell treats it as data.
Because it runs with the base repository's secrets rather than the fork's restricted token. If the workflow then checks out and runs the pull request's code, anyone who can open a pull request can run code with access to those secrets.
A moderate one. A tag can be moved to point at different code, and that has been used to attack popular actions. A branch reference is worse — it changes with every push. A SHA cannot move, at the cost of manual updates.
That the job grants scopes nothing in it appears to use. It is inferred from the steps, so it can be wrong — a script you call might need something. Treat it as a prompt to check rather than a verdict.
No. It is parsed in your browser. There is no API call and no token, which matters when the file names your secrets and environments.